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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4566
The Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Government 
of Rwanda seeks to unlock the growth and poverty 
reduction potential of the tea sector through the 
privatization of tea estates. This paper uses the logic of 
causal inference and data from the 2004 Quantitative 
Baseline Survey of the tea sector to assess the potential 
impact of the privatization program. This entails a 
normalized comparison of productivity outcomes 
to account for household heterogeneity in terms of 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 3 Division, Eastern Africa 2 Country 
Department—is part of the series of analytical work feeding into the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of Tea Sector 
Privatization in Rwanda that has also informed the Country Economic Memorandum, "Rwanda-Toward Sustained Growth 
and Competitiveness." Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at Bessamanssah@worldbank.org, Kezemenari@worldbank.org, and Vkorman@worldbank.org.
observable and non-observable determinants of these 
outcomes. The paper also compares living standards 
between tea and non-tea households. Three main findings 
emerge from the analysis. Productivity outcomes are 
generally better in the private sector than in the public 
sector. Male-headed households outperform female-
headed households along all dimensions considered here. 
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  The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) of the Government of Rwanda, published 
in 2002, identifies rural development and agricultural transformation as the top priority 
(out of six) for promoting private sector-led development in that country
1.  This high 
focus on the rural economy is justified by the fact that agriculture contributes at least 40 
percent of GDP and provides a livelihood for about 90 percent of the population. 
Therefore, growth in the agriculture is key to reducing the poverty rate of 60 percent of 
the population, based on a poverty line of 64, 000 RWF (about US $140) per person per 
year
2. 
  Agriculture also contributes significantly to Rwanda’s trade with the rest of the 
world.  In 2005, agricultural products accounted for just over 60percent of total exports in 
goods.  Tea and coffee, the main cash crops, accounts for about 56 percent of these 
exports, and more than half of Rwanda’s export revenue.  Over the past 5 years, tea has 
remained, on average, the second major export crop (after coffee), although tea exports in 
some years (notably 2000 and 2001) have exceeded coffee exports.  The sector is the 
largest employer in the country and directly generates close to 60,000 jobs.  
  Despite the growth in the sector following the genocide, several key problems 
limit the potential for this sector to generate foreign exchange and to contribute toward 
increased welfare of the population.  The key problems constraining potential in the 
sector include:  (i) agronomic conditions related to the location of factories and the 
quality and type of surrounding soil; (ii) low capacity of factories related to years of 
inadequate investment; (iii) differences in fertilizer application.  With regard to the latter 
point, there have been reports that managers of the government owned factories apply 
less than optimum levels of fertilizer in order to ensure that production levels do not 
surpass the capacity of the tea processing factories.  These problems have resulted in poor 
outcomes for the sector that are manifested in low producer prices, and low average 
yields.  Based on these poor indicators, and the inefficiency of the government owned 
factories and plantations, the Government of Rwanda initiated a reform program based on 
                                                 
1 The other five priorities include: human development, economic infrastructure, governance, private sector 
development and institutional capacity development. 
2  This is based on data from the 2001 Household Living Conditions Survey, also known as Enquête 
Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie (EICV) des Ménages au Rwanda privatization of the tea factories, to stimulate investment in the sector.  Thus, in 1999, the 
government launched a phased privatization process that ensures a significant stake for 
tea growers and other local investors while attracting foreign investment as well.   
The purpose of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment of the likely 
impact of the privatization of tea estates in Rwanda, based on data from the 2004 
Quantitative Baseline Survey of the Tea sector (QBST)
3.  The analysis is intended to 
serve as an input to the ongoing reform process.   
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 presents an overview 
of the tea sector and main issues.  Section 3 presents our evaluation framework.  Methods 
of impact evaluation are interpreted as ways of dealing with heterogeneity that may 
confound impact assessment.  Such heterogeneity stems from observable and non-
observable individual characteristics.  Section 4 offers a discussion of the empirical 
results.  It starts with a description of the underlying data.  Then, it focuses on comparing 
outcomes among tea households.  Finally, we compare living standards between these 
households and those not directly involved in the tea sector.  Concluding remarks are 
made in section 5. 
 
2.  Overview of the Tea Sector 
 
Tea is one of the two main export crops in Rwanda and has tremendous potential 
as a source of foreign exchange as well as a means of poverty reduction.  It is grown on 
roughly 11,500 hectares of land on hills or drained marsh areas, which accounts for 
roughly 1 percent of the country’s cropped area.  Tea in Rwanda is mainly cultivated by 
small farmers, on a total surface area, per farm household that is less than 0.25 hectares.  
It is one of the few labor intensive crops that provide regular cash income to farmers, and 
employment opportunities to the general rural population.  Until the onset of civil war 
and genocide of 1994, tea production had increased steadily.  
                                                 
3 Also known as Enquête Quantitative de Base auprès des ménages des zones Théicoles (EQBT) 
  2Tea production is organized around 11 estates distributed among 5 provinces
4 
mostly in the western part of the country.  An estate is a tea producing unit including a 
factory, a plantation (also known as Bloc Industriel), private tea plots and an associated 
forest to provide fuel wood to the factory for tea processing.  Not all estates have all these 
components, for instance some own no plantations (World Bank 2003, p.34).  The green 
leaves processed by a factory are supplied by the estate’s plantation (if any) and 
independent tea growers working on individual plots with an average size of 0.25 ha.  
There are about 27,000 such independent growers owning nearly 70 percent of the total 
area under tea cultivation. 
  All growers belong to some organization either a cooperative when land is 
collectively owned, or an association based on private ownership of plots, or thé 
villageois, which refer to the thousands of small-holder producers engaged in green tea 
leaf production, and who do not form part of an association that supplies green leaf tea to 
the tea factories.  There are only three cooperatives operating at Gisakura, Mulindi and 
Shagasha.  Members of these cooperatives are paid a daily wage while growers who 
belong to an association earn an income directly from the parcel of tea they own (there 
are 13 growers’ associations).  In general, growers’ organizations play a key management 
role in the process.  They distribute fertilizer, collect and deliver tea leaves to the factory, 
pay the pluckers
5 and the growers themselves, and redistribute surplus earnings to 
members.  It is estimated that a grower receives about 27 percent of the going price of a 
kilogram of leaves (12 out of 45 RWF).  Besides pluckers, growers also employ unskilled 
workers or laborers for day-to-day maintenance tasks such as weeding and drainage.   
They are employed on a daily basis and earn on average 250 RWF per day (about 50 US 
cents).  An umbrella organization FERWATHE (Fédération Rwandaise des Théiculteurs 
or Rwandese Federation of Tea Growers) was created in 2001 to protect the interests of 
growers in the new set of circumstances created by the liberalization process.  All official 
organizations are members of this federation. 
                                                 
4 (1) Byumba province: Mulindi, SORWATHE; (2) Cyangugu province: Gisakura, Nshili-Kivu, and 
Shagasha; (3) Gikongoro province: Kibati and Mata; (4) Gisenyi province: Nyabihu, Pfunda and Rubaya; 
(5) Kibuye province: Gisovu. 
5 Pluckers are skilled workers specialized in harvesting tealeaves. A pluck consists of the tea bud and one 
or two adjoining leaves and no more.  Plucks should be delivered promptly to the factory for processing to 
avoid loss of quality through withering.   
  3  Three factories have been sold so far, aside from Government shares in 
SOWARTHE which were sold in 2003.  SORWATHE
6, has always been under private 
control since its establishment in 1975.  In February 2003, the Government sold its share 
of 23.54 percent, to the private company (13.54 percent) and to the association of tea 
growers (10 percent).  A qualitative study conducted by the World Bank and the 
Government of Rwanda (World Bank 2003) to assess the likely poverty and social 
impacts of tea sector reforms noted that the yield of SORWATHE’s plantations is about 
two and a half times higher than the average yield on state-owned estates (excluding 
Nshili-Kivu)
7.  Also, yields for the independent growers associated with the private 
estate, SORWATHE, are believed to be twice as high as the average from public estates.  
These observations provide a working hypothesis for our analysis, namely that outcomes 
are expected to be better in the private sector than in the public sector. 
 
3. Accounting for Heterogeneity in Sectoral Outcome Comparison 
 
To make meaningful comparisons of outcomes across sectors, we frame the 
analysis within the logic of causal inference.  Indeed, the effect of a cause can be 
understood only in relation to another cause (Holland 1986).  This idea is akin to that of 
assessing the return to a resource engaged in one activity relative to its opportunity cost, 
i.e. what the resource would have earned in the next best alternative use.  In particular, 
for a tea household engaged in the private sector, we cannot assess the worth of the 
observed outcome without some information on the counterfactual i.e. what the 
household would have experienced had it been engaged instead in the public sector.   
Since we cannot observe a tea household engaged simultaneously in the private and 
public sectors, we construct the needed counterfactual from the information on the tea 
households engaged in the public sector.  These counterfactual outcomes are constructed, 
                                                 
6 SORWATHE stands for Société Rwandaise du Thé.  The local name of the estate is Cyohoya-Rukeri.  It 
was founded and is still owned by an American company, Tea Importers, Inc. of Westport Connecticut.  Its 
plantations cover about 2 percent (or 252 ha) of the total area under tea cultivation.  It is reported that this 
estate and the associated growers apply substantially more fertilizer than other estates. 
7 State ownership is managed by the Tea Board known as OCIRTHE an off-shoot OCIR (Office des 
Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda) which used to cover both tea and coffee. 
  4using standard methods of non-experimental impact analysis, in a way that allows us to 
attribute the net outcome to participation in the private sector. 
  The methodological issue we face here is to find a way of assessing the payoff 
from participation in a social arrangement.  For instance, if we observe that yields are 
higher for tea growers in the private than in the public sector, to conclude that 
participation in the private sector is better than in the public sector our method of 
comparison must control for any other factor (besides participation in the private sector) 
that can influence the outcome of interest.  The logic of causal inference requires a model 
that explains both the process that sorts individuals between the two states of nature 
(participation versus nonparticipation) and the conditional outcomes.  This section 
reviews the standard non-experimental methods that we use in this study, namely 
matching methods and regression analysis.  We start the discussion with a benchmark 
case where agents are assumed homogenous with respect to all other dimensions besides 
participation. 
 
The Benchmark Case of Unit Homogeneity 
 
  In general, the unit of analysis could be an individual, a household, a village, or a 
broader community such as a district or a province.  Let the variable y stand for the 
outcome of interest (e.g. yield, cost of production or expenditure per capita).  The effect 
of participation (akin to that of exposure to an intervention) on unit i, (call it gi) is 
measured relative to nonparticipation (non-exposure) on the basis of the outcome 
variable.  Formally, we write  ) ( 0 1 i i i y y g − = , where y1i is the observed outcome under 
participation and y0i is the counterfactual.  It is impossible to observe the value of the 
response variable for the same individual under two mutually exclusive states of nature 
(exposure and non-exposure).  This is why evaluation methods are considered as ways of 
dealing with this missing data problem.  If the intervention is limited to a subset of the 
population as is the case here, many of the methods suggest turning to non-exposed units 
(non-participants) in search of the missing information.  They also specify circumstances 
under which the use of such information yields reliable estimates of the relevant effect. 
  5  The assumption of unit homogeneity (Holland 1986) characterizes a benchmark 
case where the effect on individual i could be reliably estimated.  An individual response 
is a function of participation, observable and unobservable characteristics.  Suppose we 
can find among non-participants an individual j with the same pre-exposure (observable 
and non-observable) attributes as participant i.  Thus, under unit homogeneity, the 
outcome of this non-participant is a proxy for what would have happened to i had she not 
received the intervention.  Hence, the effect of the intervention on i can be estimated as:  
.  ) ( 0 1 j i i y y g − =
The assumption of unit homogeneity is thus analogous to the ceteris paribus 
assumption used in scientific enquiry.  The assumption serves as a benchmark case 
against which to assess the implications of heterogeneity.  In non-exposure state, one 
would generally expect response heterogeneity for participants and non-participants, 
particularly when eligible candidates are given the choice to participate or not
8.  Such 
heterogeneity can confound impact assessment, leading to biased results.  We now review 




  If the mechanism that sorts individuals among sectors (i.e. states of nature) is 
based exclusively on observable characteristics
9, then the counterfactual outcome for 
participant  i would be equal to the outcome of nonparticipant j with the same 
observables.  Exact matches are usually difficult to find, thus we may tolerate some 
deviation from sameness and consider nonparticipants who are almost like the participant 
under consideration (a sort of second best solution).  Let z stand for the set of observable 
characteristics of participant i.  We can think of a tolerance criterion as a cut-off distance 
                                                 
8 Heckman and Smith (1995) cite the case where those who choose to join a social program do so because 
of the poor alternative they face outside the program.  In such a case, non-participants would have better 
outcomes than participants had the latter not elected to participate.  This response heterogeneity is also 
known as selection bias. 
9 This case is known as the assumption of conditional independence.  After conditioning on observable 
characteristics, the absence of unobservable heterogeneity between participants and nonparticipant implies 
that any systematic differences in outcomes between the two groups are due to participation.  One rendition 
of the same assumption states that: given observable characteristics, potential outcomes are independent of 
participation. 
  6defining a neighborhood of z in the space of attributes such that any nonparticipant j with 
a set of attributes in that neighborhood qualifies as a look-alike for i. 
  In practice matching may become more and more difficult, the larger the set of 
observable characteristics underpinning the matching exercise.  Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) show that the dimensionality  of the problem can be significantly reduced by 
matching on the propensity score
10.  Thus instead of conditioning on an n-dimensional 
variable, units are matched on a scalar variable.  This simplification is possible because 
conditional independence remains valid if we use the propensity score p(z) instead of the 
covariates z.  
  The computation of the counterfactual outcome for any participant i with 
propensity score pi entails three basic steps: (1) Use a measure of proximity to identify 
nonparticipants in the comparison group whose scores are close enough to pi [all 
observations satisfying this condition belong to a neighborhood c(pi)]; (2)  Select a 
weighing function that assigns some weight to each member of c(pi) in the computation 
of the counterfactual outcome for participant i; (3) Compute the counterfactual outcome 
as a weighted average of the outcomes of members of c(pi) according to the following 
expression.   
        ( 3 . 1 )   ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
= ∈ =
) ( ) (
^
1 ]; 1 , 0 [ ;
i i p c j
ij
p c j
ij j ij i w w y w y
  
The feasibility of this approach requires an overlap between the distribution 
scores of participants and that of nonparticipants.  The fuller the overlap, the easier it is to 
find matches.  This is why, in practice, matching is usually restricted to the region of 
common support. 
Expression (3.1) reveals that the counterfactual outcome for participant i is 
computed as a locally weighted average or a moving average of relevant outcomes in the 
comparison group.  One can think of this procedure as sliding a window of a given width 
across the space of scores of nonparticipants and taking the average of the outcome 
variable for all observations in the window.  Furthermore, it is well known that the mean 
                                                 
10 This result is the foundation of the popular method of impact evaluation known as propensity score 
matching (PSM). The propensity score is the conditional probability of participation given the observed 
attributes.   
  7of a variable can also be computed by running a regression of the variable on a constant.  
In other terms, the locally weighted average estimator of the counterfactual outcome for 
participants i is also a locally weighted regression.  A semi-parametric extension of this 
idea is based on the following considerations. 
Assume that the outcome of nonparticipant j  is a separable function of 
observables as summarized by the propensity score pj, and unobservable characteristics 
represented by the random disturbance, uj.  Thus we write: j j j u p y + = ) ( β .  If the 
expected value of the random disturbance is zero, then Taylor’s expansion allows us to 
write the expected outcome near pi (the score of participant i) as follows. 
 
  1 0 ) ( ) ( β β β i j j p p p − + ≈         ( 3 . 2 )  
 
Locally weighted regression minimizes the following weighted sum of squares. 
 




) ( ) ( β β β i j j
n
j
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Hence, the outcome participant i would have achieved had she not participated in the 
arrangement is equal to: 
 




) ( β = i p y
 
Note that the estimate varies with location (i.e. pi).  This process must be repeated for 
each participant
11. 
As far as the choice of weights is concerned, one can follow the nearest-neighbor 
approach or use a kernel function.  For each participant i, the nearest-neighbor method 
searches for the nonparticipant j with the closest propensity score to i.  This 
nonparticipant gets a weight of 1 and all others get a weight of zero.  When there are 
many candidates, the method assigns equal weight to each and zero to nonparticipants 
 
11 Smith and Todd (2005) explain that matching by local linear regression is helpful in situations where the 
distribution of observations from the comparison group around a given participant is asymmetrical as in the 
case where there are gaps in the distribution of propensity scores. 
  8outside the neighborhood c(pi).  The weights associated with a kernel function are 
defined as follows. 
∑























w        ( 3 . 5 )    
where h stands for the tolerance level (also known as bandwidth), and the set {d=0} 
represents the comparison group. Our analysis is based on the Gaussian kernel
12.   











i p c j
j ij i i i i y w y y y g       ( 3 . 6 )  
These are the basic ingredients for the computation of an impact indicator.  The most 
commonly used indicator is the mean gain from participation
13.   It is equal to: 
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Where  T stands for the set of participants (i.e. the treated), and ωi can be 
interpreted more broadly as the evaluative weight assigned to participant i.  In standard 
applications, ωi is taken to be the sampling weight associated with observation i. To look 
beyond this average impact one can plot gi or the ratio of the observed outcome (yi) to the 
counterfactual ( ) as a function of q, the cumulative distribution of the participants 
ranked in increasing order of some variable (e.g. the counterfactual outcome).   
Participation would have a positive impact at each percentile where gi is greater than zero 




                                                 
12 Other possible choices include: Epanechnikov, bi-weight or quartic, triangular, tri-weight, uniform, and 
cosinus. 
13 This indicator is also known in the literature as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). 
14 More generally, we may also refer to these as Participation Incidence Curves.  They reveal the 
differential gains (or losses) from the participation in a social arrangement. 
  9Regression Analysis 
 
Regression analysis can also be used to control for heterogeneity. Let 
i i i u x y 1 1 1 ) ( + = β  be the outcome if unit i participates in the arrangement, and   
i i i u x y 0 0 0 ) ( + = β  the outcome in the nonparticipation state.  Let di be an indicator of 
participation which is equal to 1 in the participation state and 0 otherwise. The potential 
outcome for any unit can therefore be written as: i i i i i y d y d y 0 1 ) 1 ( − + = . This is 
equivalent to the following general expression. 
 
i i i i i i i i u d u u x x x y 0 0 1 0 1 0 )] ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( + − + − + = β β β      (3.8) 
 
Smith and Todd (2005) interpret the above equation as a random coefficient model, 
because the effect of participation varies across individuals even if we control for 
observable characteristics xi.   We get the fixed coefficient or common effect version of 
the model if we make the following two assumptions: (1) Unobservable characteristics 
are the same in the participation and nonparticipation states; (2) The 
function )] ( ) ( [ ) ( 0 1 i i i x x x β β θ − =  is constant with respect to observable characteristics. 
If, in addition we assume that β(xi) is linear in parameters, then we get the familiar 
expression of the common effect model. 
 
  i i i i u d x y + + = θ β         ( 3 . 9 )  
 
If conditional independence prevails, then di and ui are independent given xi.  O L S  




If conditional independence fails so that di is correlated with ui, then Heckman’s 
selection estimate of average impact can be obtained by applying OLS to the following 
equation (LaLonde 1986): 
 
i i u i i i d x y ν λ σ θ β ε + + + =
^
        ( 3 . 1 0 )  
 
  10where   is an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio derived from a 
probit model of participation.  The coefficient of this variable is a function of the 
covariance between unobservables in the participation model (ε) and those in the 
outcome equation (u).   






i i i i i d d λ λ λ − + =
  To relax the assumption that  θ θ = ) ( i x , we can apply the Heckman’s procedure 




1 1 1 1 = ∀ + + = i i i i i d x y ν λ σ β ε        ( 3 . 1 1 )  
 
and for nonparticipants: 
0 , 0
^
0 0 0 0 = ∀ + − = i i i i i d x y ν λ σ β ε        ( 3 . 1 2 )  
 
Estimating separate outcome equations also allows us to compute individual gains 
















⎛ − =        ( 3 . 1 3 )  
 
The Heckman approach is a two-stage procedure that treats unobservable 
heterogeneity as a problem of an omitted variable.  The proposed solution is to include an 
estimate of the omitted variable as an explanatory variable in the outcome equation
15. 
 
4.  Estimates of Potential Impacts 
In this section we estimate the potential impact of the privatization of tea estates 
in Rwanda.  The outcomes of interest are determined on the basis of policy concerns.  A 
fundamental expectation of the stakeholders is the privatization process will eventually 
lead to improved productivity and living standards for those engaged in the sector.  We 
proceed in three steps.  First we give a brief description of the sample we use in 
estimation.  Then we focus our attention to productivity issues by considering only tea-
                                                 
15 One can also resort to the instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal with unobserved heterogeneity.  
This method relies on an exclusion restriction that assumes that there is at least one variable that determines 
participation but does not affect outcomes.  This instrument can then substitute for di in equation (2.9) to 
restore some sort of conditional independence. Subsequent application of OLS would produce a consistent 
estimate of average impact.  In general, one can turn to geography, politics or discontinuities created by 
program design in search of suitable instrumental variables (Ravallion 2005). 
  11growing households, and comparing yield and cost elements between the private and 
public sector.  Finally, we use the full sample to compare economic welfare between 




Our empirical analysis is based on the QBST, a baseline survey conducted in 
2004.  It is part of a planned series of surveys designed to monitor the productivity and 
the living standard of the populations engaged in the tea sector.  It is important to keep in 
mind the survey was taken before the implementation of the privatization.  That is why 
we speak of potential impact.  The survey provides information on three basic dimensions 
of interest: (1) productivity indicators such as yield, use and cost of fertilizer; (2) living 
standard as indicated by income and expenditure; and (3) access and use of social 
services. 
The available sample includes about 2, 064 households representing the 102,812 
households living in parts of the country where tea is grown.  Thus each household in the 
sample stands for about 50 households for a total population of 515,217 inhabitants in 
tea-producing provinces.  The average household size is about 5 people.  It is estimated 
that only 30 percent of members of tea households are engaged in the tea sector.  The rest 
is employed in non tea activities.   
 
Table 1 Average Characteristics of Tea Growers 
Characteristics Private
16
  Public All 
Age 51.93  47.69  48.20 
Female 0.22  0.30  0.29 
Land 18.40  30.80  29.30 
Livestock 0.37  0.48  0.47 
Bicycle 0.16  0.06  0.07 
Water30 0.42  0.28  0.30 
Market30 0.20  0.15  0.15 
Road30 0.40  0.22  0.24 
Per Capita Expenditure  1640.39  2377.36  2288.20 
Sample Size  83  603  686 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                                                 
16 These households  are SORWATHE supported tea growers.   
  12 
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  13  Our analysis is based on the comparison of outcomes for the tea households 
supported by SORWATHE with those obtained by households dealing with the public 
sector.  The quality of the conclusions stemming from this comparison hinges on the 
extent to which both groups are homogenous.  Table 1 shows average values for nine 
observable characteristics of tea households.  It is evident that these two groups differ 
significantly along those dimensions.  For instance, the average age for SORWATHE 
households is 52 versus 47 years for households of the public sector. Average land 
holding is higher in the public sector (31 Ares
17) than in the private sector (about 18).  
The data also reveal that about 16 percent of the households in the private sector own a 
bicycle versus 6 percent in the public sector.  About 42 percent of the households in the 
private sector are less than 30 minutes from a water source compared to 28 percent in the 
public sector, similarly for the distance from a road.  Per capita expenditure for the 
comparison group is about 45 percent higher than the average expenditure for the private 
sector households. 
Table 2. Estimates from the Logit Model of the Propensity Score 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic  Prob.  
Constant -2.547092 0.498220 -5.112381  0.0000
Age 0.023063 0.008074 2.856644  0.0043
Female -0.484354 0.301886 -1.604430  0.1086
Land -0.009503 0.005706 -1.665551  0.0958
Livestock -0.080630 0.154890 -0.520564  0.6027
Bicycle 1.422839 0.398861 3.567253  0.0004
Water30 0.523196 0.255485 2.047855  0.0406
Market30 0.387526 0.317964 1.218774  0.2229
Road30 0.618112 0.261701 2.361905  0.0182
Per Capita Expenditure  -0.000418 0.000125 -3.342370  0.0008
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The above noted heterogeneity constraints our ability to find in the comparison 
group, households similar to those associated with SORWATHE. As it can be seen in 
table 2, the characteristics for which the two groups differ the most tend to have 
significant coefficients in the logit aggregation function we use to match households on 
observables.  The extent of this heterogeneity is also reveals the histograms of propensity 
                                                 
17 One unit ‘Are’ is  100 squared-meter and one  hectare (ha) is 10,000 squared-meter. Therefore, 100  Are 
is equal to 1 hectare.   
  14scores presented in figure 1.  It can be seen that the two histograms overlap most at lower 
levels of the propensity scores.  Given this situation, we impose a much tighter level of 
tolerance in matching.  For kernel matching we set the bandwidth at 0.01. 
 
The Returns to Participation in the Private Sector 
 
  Given the current organization of tea production in Rwanda, do tea households 
operating within the SORWATHE system have better outcomes than the rest?  To answer 
this question, we consider outcome differentials between the private and public sector 
along five dimensions.  The first two, yield per hectare and time taken to carry leaves to 
the collection point are indicators of productivity.  The yield is measured in kilograms 
(KG) of green tea per hectare while the time is measured in minutes.  The other tree 
dimensions are related to the cost of production.  They measure the use of fertilizer in KG 
per hectare, the cost of fertilizer in RWF per KG, and the cost of extension services per 
Are.  Table 3 shows a comparison of mean outcomes between the private and public 
sector.  This comparison does account for the heterogeneity among households. 
 
Table 3. A Naïve Comparison of Outcomes across Sectors 
Outcomes  Difference in Means  Private  Public  ALL 
Yield per Hectare  869.32  9315.10  8445.78  8555.53 
Time to Carry Leaves  -13.03  15.22  28.25  26.63 
Fertilizer Use  -176.64  513.67  690.31  664.17 
Fertilizer cost  -45.00  180.35  225.34  218.71 
Extension Cost per Are  577.67  876.16  298.51  371.32 
Sample size  -  83  603  686 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  The above results suggest that outcomes in the private sector are potentially better 
in the private sector than in the public sector.  On average, private sector households have 
higher yield than public sector ones.  They also take less time to carry leaves to the 
collection point, use less fertilizer and pay less for it than the comparison group. Private 
sector households pay more for extension services than public sector ones.  To what 
extent do these conclusions stand up to normalization on observables? 
  15Table 4 presents normalized impact estimates based on propensity score 
matching.  Given that estimates depend crucially on the choice of weights, we compute 
the estimates using five different kernel functions
18.  All five kernel functions lead to 
results that are very close to each other.  Except for the cost of fertilizer, the normalized 
estimates confirm the qualitative conclusions derived from the naïve outcome 
comparison.  The normalized comparison reveals the tea growers associated with the 
private sector do pay slightly more for fertilizer than those in the public sector.  They 
certainly have much higher yield per ha than the public sector households.  In fact the 
normalized impact estimated for yield is roughly twice the naïve one.  Yet, the better 
performing tea growers also use less fertilizer than the comparison group.  This result 
suggests the possibility of inefficiencies in public extension services.  It also suggests that 
the little extra cost for those services that the private sector households are paying per are 
may be worth it.  Finally, it is likely that private sector growers produce better quality 
leaves given that they take about 12 minutes less than the comparators to carry leaves to 
the collection point. 
 
Table 4. Accounting for Observable Heterogeneity in Outcome Comparison 
 Yield  Fertilizer 







Gauss 1768.16  -19.34  34.89 -11.58  576.32 
Epanechnikov 1746.31  -58.59  32.55  -11.84  565.54 
Quartic 1667.16  -68.94  31.52  -12.01  571.66 
Uniform 1823.47  -47.16  32.73  -11.69  550.49 
Cosinus 1732.39  -60.52  32.39  -11.87  566.70 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 5. Gender Differences in Yield 
 Gauss  Epanechnikov  Quartic  Uniform  Cosinus 
Female  1408.92  1172.29 1016.11 1329.53 1142.99 
Male  1879.64  1927.58 1872.75 1979.45 1918.51 
All  1768.16  1746.31 1667.16 1823.47 1732.39 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
                                                 
18 The quartic kernel function is also known as the bi-weight kernel.  Also note that the use of the uniform 
kernel is equivalent to radius matching, a variant of the nearest-neighbor method.  
  16  We now consider the gender dimension of some of these results.  In general, 
male-headed households outperform female-headed households along all dimensions 
considered here, (note that the comparison is between females or males in the private 
sector and their nearest neighbors, regardless of whether male or female).  We report only 
the most striking differences.  Table 5 and table 6 show differences in yields and with 
respect to the use of fertilizer between male and female-headed households.  It appears 
that men have yields that are much higher than women’s.  Yet, the former also use 
significantly less fertilizer than the latter.  Could there be a gender bias in the private 
sector’s extension services? 
 
Table 6. Gender Differences in the Use of Fertilizer 
 Gauss  Epanechnikov  Quartic  Uniform  Cosinus 
Female 84.74  112.11  103.15  106.77  110.41 
Male -52.80  -114.45  -125.27  -97.54  -116.46 
All -19.34  -58.59  -68.94  -47.16  -60.52 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Looking Beyond the Tea Sector 
 
Up to now, we have focused our attention on tea households, comparing outcomes 
for those engaged in the private sector with outcomes observed in the public sector.  The 
development of the tea sector is a key element of the agricultural policy in support of the 
poverty reduction strategy in Rwanda.  A recent analysis of the 2001 household survey 
by Dabalen et al. (2004) reveals that agriculture remains the principal source of earnings 
for the poor and that non-poor households are more likely than poor households to have 
earnings from non-farm activities.  In this perspective, we analyze the available data to 
determine whether, other things being equal, tea households are better off than 
households who earn their living mostly from non-tea activities.  We proceed in a manner 
that is entirely analogous to the way we compared outcomes within the tea sector.  We 
use a set of observable characteristics to attenuate some of the bias due to such 
characteristics. 
 
  17 
Table 7. Average Characteristics for Tea and Non-Tea Households 
Characteristics Tea  Non-Tea  ALL 
Age 44.99  46.30  45.68 
Education (years)  2.89  2.43  2.65 
Male 0.75  0.67  0.71 
Household Size  5.19  4.84  5.01 
Land (ares)  20.37  0.02  9.83 
Livestock 3.49  3.01  3.25 
Bicycle 0.07  0.04  0.05 
Road30 0.24  0.22  0.23 
Water30 0.28  0.24  0.26 
Sample Size  986  1053  2039 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  Table 7 presents some average characteristics for 986 tea households and 1053 
non-tea households.  The most striking difference between these two groups relates to 
land ownership. Average landholding among tea households is more than a thousand 
times the average for non tea households.  As one would expect, land ownership is a key 
determinant of participation in the tea sector.  This fact is confirmed by the estimation 
results of a logit model of participation presented in table 8.  In this model, land 
ownership has a very high level of statistical significance.  Beyond land ownership, these 
results also indicate that gender (i.e being male) and years of education have a significant 
and positive impact on the likelihood that a household is engaged in the tea sector.  
 
Table 8. A Model of Participation in the Tea Sector 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic  Prob.  
Constant 0.277728 0.531392 0.522642  0.6012
Age -0.063520 0.025603 -2.480920  0.0131
Age Squared  0.000333 0.000265 1.253871  0.2099
Years of Education  0.121048 0.049172 2.461716  0.0138
Years of Education Squared  -0.016652 0.005332 -3.122850  0.0018
Male 0.513665 0.160782 3.194791  0.0014
Household Size  0.069233 0.039357 1.759115  0.0786
Land Area  1.413235 0.178340 7.924366  0.0000
Livestock -0.029024 0.019176 -1.513571  0.1301
Bicycle 0.472874 0.294378 1.606347  0.1082
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  18To what extent, if at all, are tea households better off than non-tea households? 
We base our answer to this question on several types of comparisons. Table 9  presents 
results from a naïve welfare comparison based on both per capita expenditure and  per 
capita income.  As noted earlier this type of comparison does not account for any 
heterogeneity between the two groups.  The results suggest that, in tea cultivating regions 
of Rwanda, average welfare is higher for tea households than for non-tea households. 
 
 
Table  9.  Naïve Comparison of Welfare between Tea and Non-Tea Households 
Outcome  Difference in Means  Tea  Non-Tea   All 
Per capita Expenditure  1936.43  25397.66  23461.23  24399.25 
Per capita Income  2571.38  23075.70  20504.32  21721.56 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 10. Matching Comparison of Welfare between Tea and Non-Tea Households 
 
Kernel  Per Capita Expenditure  Per Capita Income 
Gauss 6504.71  5488.51 
Epanechnikov 6765.65  6659.29 
Quartic 6722.41  6628.20 
Uniform 6831.99  6770.90 
Cosinus 6757.93  6651.70 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
  Next we use the regression methods described above in order to account for both 
observable and non-observable heterogeneity.  In the case of the Heckman method, the 
selectivity correction factor turned out not to be statistically significant.  This gave us 
comfort in our use of the propensity score matching method.  The corresponding results 
are presented in table 10.  These reveal that when likes are compared with likes, the 
welfare advantage that tea households have over the non-tea households is much higher 
than what the naïve comparison would suggest.  Indeed, regardless of the kernel function 
used among the ones reported in table 10, average per capita expenditure for tea 
households is more than the average for non-tea households by about 7,000 RWF   
   
As a last test for the robustness of our conclusion, we use a two-stage procedure 
explained by Wooldridge (2002).  First estimate the participation equation as a nonlinear 
  19binary response model using the probit or logit model, just as in the first stage of 
propensity score matching  Then use the estimated propensity score as an instrument for 
the participation indicator in the outcome equation and run OLS to estimate average 
impact.  The results of this procedure applied to per capita expenditure are presented in 
table 11.  They show that average difference in welfare between the two groups is 




Table 11. Regression Estimation of Average Difference in Per Capita Expenditure 
(Instrumental Variable Method) 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
Constant 26518.49 2816.683 9.414794  0.0000
Male 2425.350 1168.025 2.076455  0.0380
Age 72.04438 33.89080 2.125780  0.0336
Education 1362.314 169.3803 8.042931  0.0000
Household size  -1570.103 262.6600 -5.977702  0.0000
Livestock 2219.420 293.1086 7.572006  0.0000
Market30 -6361.600 2183.026 -2.914120  0.0036
Market60 -3686.614 1985.779 -1.856508  0.0635
Market90 -5254.870 1981.555 -2.651892  0.0081
Market90P -5949.287 2009.430 -2.960683  0.0031
Road30 -2144.925 1193.769 -1.796767  0.0725
Water30 -974.0571 1140.822 -0.853821  0.3933
Propensity Score  3643.693 1452.421 2.508703  0.0122
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
  As one of the two main export crops in Rwanda, tea is a significant source of 
foreign exchange and potentially an important means of poverty reduction.  It is in fact 
one of the few labor intensive crops that provide regular cash income to farmers and 
employment opportunities to some of the rural population.  The Poverty Reduction 
Strategy of the Government of Rwanda seeks to unlock this potential by reforming its 
agricultural policy in general while focusing particularly on the key factors that constraint 
growth in the tea sector.  An important component of this program of reforms involves 
the privatization of tea factories.  
  20  This paper uses data from the 2004 Quantitative Baseline Survey of the Tea sector 
to assess the potential impact of privatization of tea estates.  The analysis is framed 
within the logic of causal inference.  This entails a normalized comparison of outcomes 
to account for household heterogeneity in terms of observable and non-observable 
determinants of the outcomes of interest.  These outcomes relate to productivity.  Three 
main findings emerge from this comparison.  Productivity outcomes such as yield, time 
taken to carry leaves to the collection point, and fertilizer use are generally better in the 
private sector than in the public sector.  Also, male-headed households out perform 
female-headed households along all dimensions consider here.  Finally, in a welfare 







Brambilla, Irene and Porto, Guido G.  2005.  Farm Productivity and Market Structure: 
Evidence from Cotton Reforms in Zambia.  Discussion Paper No.919.  New 
Haven: Economic Growth Center (Yale University). 
Dabalen, Andrew, Paternostro, Stefano and Gaëlle, Pierre.  2004.  The Returns to 
Participation in the Nonfarm Sector in Rural Rwanda.  World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3462. 
Diop, Ndiame, Brenton, Paul and Asarkaya, Yakup.  2005.  Trade Costs, Export 
Development and Poverty in Rwanda.  World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 
3784. 
Essama-Nssah, B.  2006.  Propensity Score Matching and Policy Impact Analysis: A 
Demonstration in EViews.  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
3877. 
Holland, Paul W.  1986.  Statistics and Causal Inference.  Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, Vol. 81, No. 396: 945-960. 
  21  22
LaLonde, Robert J.  1986.  Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs 
with Experimental Data.  The American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 4:604-
620. 
Loader, Catherine.  2004.  Smoothing: Local Regression Techniques. In James Gentle, 
Wolgang Hardle, Yoichi Mori (eds): Handbook of Computational Statistics.  
Heidelberg:  Springer-Verlag. 
Maddala, G. S.  1983.  Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ravallion, Martin.  2005.  Evaluating Anti-Poverty Programs.  World Bank Policy 
Research Paper No. 3625.  Washington D.C:  The World Bank. 
Rosenbaum, Paul and Rubin, Donald.  1983.  The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects.  Biometrika, Vol.70, No.1:41-55. 
Smith, Jeffrey A. and Todd, Petra E.  2005.  Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s 
Critique of Nonexperimental Estimators?  Journal of Econometrics, Volume 
125, No. 1-2: 305-353. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.  2002.  Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.  
Cambridge (Massachusetts): The MIT Press. 
World Bank.  2003.  Rwanda Tea Sector Reform: Analysis of Poverty and Social Impacts 
― Stakeholder and Institutional Analysis.  Washington, DC.  The World Bank 
(mimeo) 
 